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THE CONSTITUTION AND POLITICS OF THE BŒOTIAN LEAGUE

FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE YEAR 387 B. C.

THE chief reason for this study is the new light thrown on the subject by the fragment of a Hellenica recently discovered in Oxyrrhynchus, Egypt.¹ The author, whose name is unknown to us but who must have composed his work between 387 and 346 B. C., shows an intimate and accurate acquaintance with Greek affairs in the period of which he treats. The work is a detailed history of Greece, beginning probably from the point at which that of Thucydides ends and continuing at least to the battle of Cnidos (394 B. C.).² The recovered fragment has to do merely with some of the events of 396–395, but refers incidentally to earlier time. It is only by way of digression that the author touches upon the federal constitution of Bœotia; but the information which he thus gives has rendered all modern views of the subject antiquated. For the purpose of bringing the new information into its proper connection with the facts already known and of offering a slight contribution, independently of the new source, to the earlier history of the League, the present study is made to extend over the entire development of the institution from its beginning to the year 387 B. C. For the time subsequent to this date the reader is referred to the article on Bœotia by F. Cauer.³ The portion of history which forms the subject of this paper is divided for convenience into three periods.

¹ Oxyrrhynchus Papyri, vol. v (London, 1908), edited by B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt.

² On the date, authorship and character of the work, see *op. cit.*, pp. 121 *et seq.*

³ In Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopædie, vol. iii, pp. 637–663. Though this article is generally reliable, the author has made some serious mistakes in his use of coins, to which attention is called below. For information on the coinage I have depended, as have Cauer and the editors of the Oxyrrhynchus Hellenica, on B. V. Head, Catalogue of Greek Coins, vol. viii: Central Greece (London, 1884).

I. *From the founding of the League to its temporary dissolution in 479 B. C.*

A. THE LEAGUE

Two facts bear on the date of its formation. The first is that the author of the Homeric catalogue of ships was acquainted with a league of most of the Bœotian states, which, according to his authority, furnished fifty ships for the expedition against Troy, whereas Orchomenos and Aspledon together furnished thirty.¹ This part of the *Iliad* is relatively late; it belongs to the time of the aristocracy rather than to that of the kingship. The second fact, closely harmonizing with the one given, is that the League itself was never ruled by kings.² It would be reasonable, accordingly, to assign its beginnings to the time shortly following the downfall of monarchy—approximately to 700 B. C.

Doubtless still earlier in origin was the Bœotian amphictyony, whose principal seat was "sacred Onchestos, Poseidon's bright grove."³ Another general shrine was the temple of Itonian Athena, where the Bœotians gathered in assembly to celebrate the Pambœotia, perhaps to elect their representatives to the Delphic amphictyonic council, and to transact other religious business.⁴ The historical connection between the amphictyony and the federal union has not been precisely determined. The one probably prepared the ground for the other; and certainly here as elsewhere the tie of religion reinforced the political association.

In this period a little light begins to be shed on the relations of the states to one another by the coinage. The earliest coins of the country are of the Æginetan standard, and the reason for this fact is to be sought in the close relation between Ægina and Orchomenos as members of the Calaurian amphictyony.

¹ *Iliad*, ii, 494-510.

² Only local kings are mentioned: cf. Strabo ix, 1, 7, C. 393; Ephorus, *Frag.* 25; Plutarch, *Cimon*, 1.

³ *Iliad*, ii, 506; Homeric Hymn to Apollo, 52; to Hermes, 88, 190. Strabo ix, 2, 33, C 412, is authority for its being the seat of the amphictyony.

⁴ Strabo ix, 2, 29; Pausanias ix, 34, 1; cf. Polybius iv, 3; ix, 34. The mythical Amphictyon mentioned in this connection (cf. the Athenian Amphictyon) may indicate a relation to the Delphic quite as well as to the Bœotian amphictyony.

Probably, therefore, the first Bæotian coins were struck at Orchomenos, whence the standard and type extended to the other states. The earliest pieces of which the dates have been approximately determined belong to 600–550 B. C. The obverse shows the Bæotian shield—the “false-notched” oval, closely related to the Attic Dipylon type.¹ For this early period no coins of the type can be proved to belong to Orchomenos, whereas Haliartos and Tanagra are known to have used the design. Many, however, like those of early Ægina and of early Greek cities in general, bear no city initials, and some of this class may have been Orchomenian as well as Theban.² The coinage of the towns was so similar that we must assume a federal regulation; but the fact of their issue by individual cities proves that Thebes had not yet become dominant. It would accord well with the little we know of this matter to suppose that, when the federal government adopted the buckler as a design for its coin, Orchomenos dropped it from her own currency, preferring a distinct type.³ The divergence of usage, however explained, indicates that this city stood in a peculiar relation to the union. Tradition, confirmed by Mycenæan archæology, makes Orchomenos the wealthiest and most powerful city of Bæotia.⁴ It is said that in early time Thebes always paid tribute to her.⁵ Probably other Bæotian cities were once in the same dependent condition. It would not be difficult to believe, therefore, that the union was formed under the leadership of Thebes to secure the independence of Bæotia. The author of the catalogue of ships knows of but one community, Aspledon, about twenty stadia distant,⁶ which was still dependent on Orchomenos. At that time the latter city was in

¹ Head's conjecture (Greek Coins, vol. viii, p. xxxvi), that this form of buckler had its origin in Thebes, was made before its historical connection had been pointed out. Cf. G. Lippold, *Münchener archäologische Studien* (1909), pp. 410 *et seq.*

² This explanation seems more satisfactory than that of Head, *op. cit.*, p. xxxvii, who assigns the latter class of coins to Thebes. For the close dependence of the Orchomenian coinage on that of Ægina, dating perhaps from the seventh century B. C., see Hill, *Historical Greek Coins*, pp. 4–7.

³ Head, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁴ Cf. *Iliad*, ii, 511; ix, 381; *Odyssey*, xi, 284, 459; Hesiod, *Ecœæ*, frag. 144.4 (Rzach).

⁵ Strabo ix, 2, 40.

⁶ *Ibid.* ix, 2, 41.

a position to make an alliance with the union as a whole on a practically equal footing; and doubtless for a long time after entering the League she enjoyed exceptional advantages. From 550 B. C. to the great war with Persia, coins were struck by Acræphium, Coroneia, Haliartos, Mycalessos, Orchomenos, Pharæ, Tanagra and Thebes—Orchomenos being still the only city which does not have the shield.¹ These seven must have been the independent members of the League at that time. The chief federal magistrates in this period, as in later time, were the *bœotarchs*. We are not informed, however, as to their number or their functions.²

Thebes was growing powerful and was beginning to encroach on the rights of individual states. It was but natural that a city in her position should attempt to absorb her neighbors, so as to convert the League into a great state, in some such way as Athens and Lacedæmon had developed. The first recorded attempt at this form of aggrandizement was made on Platæa toward the end of the sixth century.³ But unfortunately for the Theban policy of annexation, the Platæans found sympathizers among the more powerful states of Greece. Athens gave the aggrieved city the desired alliance and protection and thus helped to bring about what Freeman⁴ has termed the first known secession from a federal union. The reason offered by the seceders for the action was their desire to escape from Theban oppression. On this occasion the Corinthians, called to arbitrate between the contending parties, declared that the Thebans should refrain from molesting those who did not wish to be reckoned among the Bœotians.⁵ On such a principle no Greek federation could be permanent.⁶ In fact, under the conditions then prevailing, a territory so extensive as Bœotia could

¹ Head, *op. cit.*, p. xxxvii.

² Herodotus ix, 15, is the first to mention them. He states that they coöperated with Mardonius and furnished him with guides.

³ Herodotus vi, 108; Thucydides iii, 55, 66.

⁴ History of Federal Government, vol. i, p. 166.

⁵ Herodotus vi, 108.

⁶ As the Thebans were allies of Pisistratos (Herodotus ix, 61; Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 15), the revolt of Platæa to Athens must have taken place after the downfall of the tyrants in 510.

hardly be united under a strong government without the application of force and the temporary infliction of injustice on localities. The outcome was a severe blow to Bœotia and to Thebes; the former yielded to Athens not only Plataea but also, at about the same time,¹ Hysiaë and Eleutheræ, whereas Thebes lost prestige and was deprived of considerable territory of her own. Probably these circumstances had much to do with determining the attitude of Bœotia toward the Persians in the attempt they soon afterward made to conquer Greece.

B. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE CITIES

Originally the individual states were monarchical.² In case a king was incompetent, through age or for any other cause, to command the army, it was customary for the community in time of war to elect a general. According to tradition, which may contain a grain of truth, the Thebans once chose Peneleos archon to conduct an expedition because their king was not yet old enough for the duty.³ This story doubtless embodies a faint memory of the beginning of the republic. After Peneleos was slain, they chose as his successor Tisamenos, the rightful heir. Then for three generations they elected kings from the house of Peneleos, the last being Xanthos. He was killed by treachery in single combat, whereupon the Thebans resolved to intrust their government to several magistrates and no longer to let everything depend on one man.⁴

One of the highest offices in Thebes, as at Athens, during the early republic was the archonship. This magistrate soon de-

¹ Pausanias ix, 2, 2.

² For the mythical kings of Thebes, see Pausanias ix, 5; of Orchomenos, Strabo ix, 2, 40, C. 414 and Pausanias ix, 34, 10; of Plataea, Pausanias ix, 1, 1.

³ Pausanias ix, 5, 15. Reference here may be to the office of archon, which later declined into a priesthood; but the military function points rather to the polemarchy. At Athens, too, the polemarchy was the first great office to be instituted in the transition from kingship to republic; Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, 3.

⁴ Pausanias *loc. cit.* There are some points of resemblance between this story and that of the end of the Athenian kingship. The aristocratic magistrates are indiscriminately called βασιλεις by Hesiod, just as the inferior chiefs of the kingly period are so termed by Homer.

clined in importance till he became a mere priest.¹ The political power went to the three polemarchs.² Their number may have corresponded to a tripartite division of the state.³ They commanded the army and were the chief executives. It is known that in the fourth century they still had power to arrest anyone whom they thought deserving of the death penalty,⁴ and that in Orchomenos they had financial duties and presided over public meetings of the citizens.⁵ As no trace of a popular assembly can be found before the fourth century, we must conclude that the magistrates were appointed by the council (*βουλή*), which represented the oligarchy of this early time.

The nobles, who monopolized the political power, were all large landowners, as elsewhere in early Greece. It was in this period that Philolaos, a member of the ruling family of the Bacchiadae at Corinth, left his native city to spend the remainder of his life at Thebes. The oligarchs of the latter state engaged him to draw up laws for them on various subjects, including inheritance and adoption.⁶ Two deductions may safely be drawn relative to his legislation: (1) that he patterned his laws after those of his native city; (2) that they favored the nobles. His primary object, says Aristotle, was to maintain unchanged the number of holdings. Large tracts of land in Greece, belonging originally to the state or to its component societies, were on the downfall of kingship seized by the nobles.⁷ While

¹ Plutarch, *De genio Socratis*, 31. It is by no means unlikely that the Athenians adopted the office from one of the Boeotian towns.

² Cf. Gilbert, *Griechische Staatsaltertümer*, vol. ii, p. 61, n. 4.

³ Two tribes at Orchomenos are referred to King Eteocles as author by Pausanias ix, 34, 10. The total number was probably greater. But Szanto, *Ausgewählte Abhandlungen*, p. 250, doubts the existence of these tribes, or at most regards them as exceptional. He holds that in general the Boeotian cities did not have a tribal organization.

⁴ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, v, 2, 30.

⁵ Cf. Gilbert, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 62, n. 2. The Athenian polemarch had a very different history because of the fact that he soon came to be limited by a board of generals. The latter seem to have no parallel in early Boeotia.

⁶ Aristotle, *Politics*, ii, 12, 6 *et seq.*, p. 1274.

⁷ Cf. the conduct of the ravenous suitors of Penelope. They may be taken as an illustration of the aristocratic hunger for the possessions of the absent or dethroned king. On the insecurity of inheritance see, further, *Odyssey*, iv, 756 *et seq.*, vii, 149 *et seq.*

the idea of property in land was still vague and the dominance of the nobility not as yet fully acknowledged, the common people naturally strove for a share in this benefit. In opposition to their efforts the laws of Philolaos aimed to maintain the agrarian *status quo* and to render property rights more determinate. At about the same time the archonship was instituted at Athens for the same purpose. This magistrate's edict, "whatever anyone possesses when I enter office, that he shall continue to possess to the end of my term," repeated annually upon the assumption of his official duties,¹ implies a prevailing instability of property rights and attempts to correct the defect, as circumstances clearly indicate, in the interests of the ruling class. Agrarian conditions in Bœotia and Attica during the seventh century were similar. The former country seems on the whole to have been more advanced in settled life and general culture than the latter; so that if we assume a mutual borrowing of ideas and customs, we must regard the Bœotians as the chief creditors. Another law of the same period, which we may safely assign to Philolaos, excluded from office all who were engaged in industrial or mercantile occupations.²

The oligarchic magistrate exercised his judicial power most unmercifully. He was a notorious swallower of bribes, whose decisions were crooked.³ Hesiod⁴ represents him as a hawk and the plain man under prosecution before his court as the nightingale. The bird of prey gloats over his power to eat or to let go his victim, loudly boasting that might is the only law.⁵ There is no wonder that Hesiod earnestly warns the peasant against the dangers of borrowing; for insolvent debtors were certainly treated with no less severity in Bœotia than in Attica during the same period.⁶

¹ Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, lvi, 2: Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀρχων εὐθὺς εἰσελθὼν πρῶτον μὲν κηρύττει ὅσα τις εἶχον πρὶν αὐτοῦ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν, ταῦτ' ἔχειν καὶ κρατεῖν μέχρι ἀρχῆς τέλους.

² Aristotle, Politics, iii, 5, 4, p. 1278, a, 25: 'Ἐν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἦν τὸν δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀπεσχημένον τῆς ἀγορᾶς μὴ μετέχειν ἀρχῆς; cf. iv, 7, 5, p. 1321, a, 28. The exemption from the law after ten years of retirement from business was probably due to an amendment; see *infra*, p. 282 n. 1. ³ Hesiod, Works and Days, 250.

⁴ *Ibid.* 212 *et seq.* See in general, 202-273.

⁵ *Ibid.* 394 *et seq.*

⁶ In far later time they were publicly disgraced in the market-place; Nicolaus of Damascus, frag. 113, in Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum*, vol. iii, p. 458.

From the beginning four or five families in Thebes surpassed all the others in influence.¹ The oligarchic circle gradually narrowed to a clique (*ὀλιγαρχία*) of a few men, who ruled despotically.² The cowed masses meekly followed their leaders, not of their own free will but because they had long been accustomed to servitude.³ According to the later account of the Thebans, the responsibility for the disloyalty of their city in the war with Persia rested wholly with these men, who sided with the enemies of Greece to further their own interests⁴; whereas the leaders themselves asserted that they adopted this policy merely as the representatives of the state.⁵ There is this much truth in the latter view, that, as Plataea and Athens stood together against Persia,⁶ Thebes thought it to her advantage to take the opposite side, in the hope of winning back what she had lost. The battle of Plataea brought the governing clique at Thebes to a sudden end. One of its members escaped, but the others were surrendered by the Thebans to Pausanias, who put them to death without a trial.⁷

II. *From the dissolution of the League in 479 to its restoration in 447 B. C.*

A. RELATIONS AMONG THE STATES

Thebes immediately lost her leadership of the union.⁸ Her coins still bore the shield, but she dropped from them the general Boeotian name, leaving them either without an inscription or merely with her own initials, Θ Ε.⁹ Head¹⁰ calls atten-

¹ Four families boasted of their descent from the Spartoi, contemporaries of Cadmus, and a fifth claimed equal age and honor; Pausanias ix, 5, 3.

² Thucydides iii, 62, 3.

³ Plutarch, Aristides, 18.

⁴ Thucydides iii, 62, 3.

⁵ Herodotus ix, 87.

⁶ The Thespians, too, were loyal to Greece, whereas most of the other Boeotians submitted to the king (Herodotus vii, 132; Diodorus xi, 3, 2) and fought on his side at Plataea; Herodotus viii, 34. Afterward, feeling ashamed of their conduct, the Boeotians invented the story that they had marched 10,500 strong under four boeotarchs against the enemy; Pausanias x, 20, 3.

⁷ Herodotus ix, 86-88; Diodorus xi, 33, 4. ⁸ Diodorus xi, 81, 1; Justin iii, 6, 10.

⁹ Head, Greek Coins, vol. viii, pp. xxxviii, 69 *et seq.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.* pp. xxxviii, 60. Cauer, in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopädie, vol. iii, p. 645, has strangely misstated the facts. The coins of Thebes and Tanagra were alike in bearing the federal type but differed essentially in inscription.

tion to the interesting fact that in this period the coins of Tanagra alone bear the Bœotian name, and he cleverly infers therefrom that this city now aspired to the headship of the union. Although Tanagra may have cherished the ambition, she certainly failed to realize it; in fact through most of the period the union was non-existent. The Lacedæmonians, who had done most to bring about its dissolution, now aimed to oust the Bœotians and other disloyal Greeks from the Delphic amphictyony; but their attempt was frustrated by Themistocles (about 475 B. C.).¹ His policy shows that the Athenians were taking a warm interest in the protection of Bœotia from further degradation; but it was certainly against their interest that the League should be revived. The attempt of Tanagra to reform it under her own leadership, if her coinage should be so interpreted, was likely to bring upon her the hostility of Athens.²

Circumstances soon wrought a complete change in the relations between Bœotia, Athens, and Sparta. The growing maritime empire of Athens awakened the fear of Lacedæmon, and the latter began accordingly to seek friends in central Greece among the states she had formerly despised. Meanwhile the Thebans, who had been humiliated because of their disloyalty in the Persian war, were casting about for means whereby they might recover their earlier power and reputation.³ As the former members of the League would have nothing to do with them, they besought the Lacedæmonians to aid them in regaining the hegemony over Bœotia, promising in return for this favor to wage war with their own forces against the Athenians, that the Lacedæmonians might no longer need to lead forth their infantry beyond the borders of Peloponnesus.⁴ The bargain was struck. According to Diodorus the Lacedæmonians, who had an army at hand,⁵ enlarged the walls of Thebes and

¹ Plutarch, Themistocles, 20.

² Head, *loc. cit.*, is therefore wrong in supposing that such a Tanagran policy would receive encouragement from Athens. After the victory of Œenophyta, Tanagra was the first to suffer punishment (Thucydides i, 108)—doubtless for treachery, though with our scant knowledge we should not be warranted in drawing more specific inferences regarding the relations between that city and Athens.

³ Diodorus xi, 81, 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 2.

⁵ Thucydides i, 107.

compelled the other Bœotians to submit to her.¹ Some may have been forcibly removed from their homes to swell the population of the dominant city. The battle of Tanagra, fought with the Athenians in 457, was however but a temporary victory for the Theban cause. Two months later² the Athenians marched forth under Myronides and defeated the Bœotians at Œenophyta. The victors were masters of all Bœotia. They dismantled the walls of Tanagra³ and took possession of all the cities with the exception of Thebes.⁴ This great success resulted, not from the battle alone, but largely from factional strife in the cities.⁵

In acting thus the Athenians felt that they were liberating Bœotia from servitude to Thebes, and that they were righting a further wrong in restoring those who had been banished from the various cities.⁶ Evidently these exiles were opposed to Theban hegemony and friendly to Athens. The leaders of the opposite faction were banished.⁷ The cities now came into alliance with Athens; they acknowledged her hegemony and performed military service for her,⁸ under what conditions is unknown. Thucydides looked upon them as in some degree subject to Athens.⁹ It was natural, then, that the Thebans should speak of the Athenian success as a conquest and of the subsequent Bœotian victory at Coroneia as a liberation.¹⁰

The status of the cities is illustrated by the coinage, which Head¹¹ assigns to this decade of Athenian supremacy (457-447

¹ Diodorus xi, 81, 3. On the extension of the walls, see Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, in *Hermes*, vol. xxvi (1891), pp. 191 *et seq.* It is possible, however, that this enlargement belongs to a later date; see *infra*, p. 293, n. 4.

² About September, 457; Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, vol. iii, p. 319. For the battle, see Thucydides i, 108; Diodorus xi, 82; Pausanias i, 29, 9; Polyænus i, 35.

³ Thucydides i, 108, 3.

⁴ Diodorus xi, 83, 1.

⁵ Thucydides iii, 62, 5; iv, 92, 6; *cf.* Pericles, in Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii, 4, p. 1407 a.

⁶ Plato, *Menexenus*, xiii, p. 242 b; *cf.* Alcibiades, i, p. 112 c.

⁷ Thucydides i, 113, 4, speaks of their return after the battle of Coroneia.

⁸ *Ibid.* i, 111, 1. They are here spoken of as *ἐνυμᾶχοι*.

⁹ As may be inferred from his statement that the Athenian defeat at Coroneia left them *αὐτόνομοι*; i, 113, 4.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* iii, 62, 5.

¹¹ *Greek Coins*, vol. viii, p. xxxix.

B. C.). Acræphium, Coroneia, Haliartos, Tanagra and Thebes struck coins, all bearing on the obverse the Bœotian shield but lacking the Bœotian name. On the reverse the several cities stamped their individual types—a cantharos, a gorgoneion *etc.*—with an abbreviation of the city name.¹ The five states mentioned by Head were among the seven independent members of the union as it had been composed in the earlier period. The continuance of the shield was due to force of habit or, at most, to a theoretical survival of the union, whereas the individual devices of the cities are an expression of the separatism upheld by the factions then dominant and encouraged by the Athenians.

B. THE POLITICS OF THE STATES

In our study of the politics of the Bœotian cities of this decade we meet with an interesting problem. In the opinion of Busolt,² Thebes was under democratic control at the time when she called the Lacedæmonians to aid her in the recovery of her supremacy. He believes that this party had come into power after the battle of Plataæa. His theory assumes the oligarchs to have been generally supreme in the other Bœotian cities, but to have given way to democracies under Spartan influence. When Athens intervened, it was accordingly in support of the Bœotian oligarchs. She put down the democratic governments and restored the aristocratic exiles. But a revolution soon afterward took place in Thebes. The oligarchs got control, and at about the same time the oligarchic factions in the various cities began to oppress the commons and, turning their backs upon Athens, sought friendly relations with Thebes. Then the Athenians, siding with the democrats in the cities, drove the oligarchs into exile. The whole theory is got up to explain a passage in the pseudo-Xenophontic treatise on the Athenian constitution:³ “As often as they (the Athenians) have attempted to choose the side of the aristocrats, it has proved a disadvantage to them ;

¹ Here again Cauer, *loc. cit.*, p. 645, is wrong in saying that these coins lacked the federal arms.

² Griechische Geschichte, vol. iii, p. 320 and n. 3.

³ III, ii: ‘Ὅποσάκις δ’ ἐπεχείρησαν αἰρεῖσθαι τοὺς βελτίστους, οὐ συνήνεγκεν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐντὸς ὀλίγου χρόνου ὁ δῆμος ἐδούλευσεν· ὁ μὲν ἐν Βοιωτοῖς.

and within a short time the demos, for instance in Bœotia, has fallen into slavery."

Although no part of the theory is absolutely impossible, it is as a whole so unlikely that strong evidence would be necessary to induce us to accept it. In the first place it is wholly improbable that after the battle of Platæa the Lacedæmonians, who were masters of the situation, permitted the setting-up of a government in Thebes which Aristotle could describe as democratic. It would seem strange, too, that Thebes should be democratic while all the other Bœotian cities were oligarchic, and that Sparta should be supporting democracy and Athens at the same time aristocracy. If Athens found the democracy established in all the Bœotian towns and the oligarchs in exile, why should she recall the latter? Would they be more inclined to submit to her than to Thebes? And when Thebes afterward set up an oligarchy, why should Athens forthwith espouse the cause of democracy and send the recently restored oligarchs back into exile? Busolt has not answered these questions. He and those of his opinion take too much trouble to explain the passage in pseudo-Xenophon above quoted. If the Athenians favored oligarchy in a single city, it would have sufficed for that writer's purpose.

The following sketch of party relations during the period seems more reasonable. When after the battle of Platæa the Lacedæmonians overthrew the cabal (*δυναστεία*) which governed Thebes, they set up in its place a moderate oligarchy—the *ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος* of which the Thebans afterward boasted.¹ The other Bœotian cities may have varied in constitution, but the prevailing form was doubtless also oligarchic. Neither democrats nor oligarchs willingly submitted to Thebes. When the Lacedæmonians interfered in the interest of the latter, 457 B. C., it was to place in office in the various states men who were willing to follow Theban leadership. These persons usually constituted an oligarchy, though they could not have been iden-

¹ Thucydides iii, 62, 5. Perhaps at this time the law of Philolaos on qualifications for office was so amended as to admit those who had ceased for ten years from industrial and mercantile pursuits; Aristotle, Politics, iii, 5, 4, p. 1278 a, 25; cf. *supra*, p. 277, n. 2.

tical with the former rulers of the cities. In general this revolution consisted in the substitution of one oligarchic faction for another. Those who refused to submit to the leadership of Thebes, whether oligarchs or democrats, were sent into exile. The Athenian victory at Œenophyta everywhere encouraged the democrats to seize the government. This change of party took place in Thebes¹ and in most or all of the Bœotian cities. Athens now banished those who opposed her leadership—mainly the oligarchic factions² set up by Lacedæmon—and recalled from exile those whom the Lacedæmonians had banished. They were restored, not necessarily to power, but to their homes and civil rights. Although Athens favored democracy, one or two states that came under her hegemony may have been oligarchies and have continued in this condition, or may have been changed to oligarchies by the return of the exiles. Soon afterward the democracy at Thebes was overthrown³; whereupon the one or two oligarchies, favored or tolerated by Athens, sided with Thebes and began to treat the commons like slaves. This simple, direct interpretation of the few known facts is offered as preferable to the far-fetched theory of Busolt.

The supremacy of Athens lasted ten years (457–447 B. C.). Exiles from Bœotia and Eubœa, to whom were added some Locrians, returned in large numbers and seized Orchomenos, Chæroneia and certain other places. The fact that they were oligarchs is well known.⁴ The Athenians made insufficient provisions for meeting this emergency. Tolmides, their general, was overthrown and killed at Coroneia, and most of his soldiers were either slain or taken captive. To secure the release of the prisoners Pericles agreed to evacuate all Bœotia⁵ with the excep-

¹ We are informed by Aristotle, *Politics*, v, 3, p. 1302 b, 25, that there was a democracy in Thebes after the battle of Œenophyta, though he does not state when it was established.

² On the political character of these exiles, see *infra*, p. 286, n. 5.

³ Aristotle, *Politics*, v, 3, p. 1302 b, 25, states that the change resulted from the contempt in which the well-to-do held the license and anarchy of democratic rule.

⁴ Thucydides i, 113, 2. Their associates, the Eubœans, certainly were; and the governments which they established on their return were oligarchic.

⁵ *Ibid.* i, 113 (*cf.* iii, 62; iv, 92); Diodorus xii, 6; Plutarch, *Pericles*, 18; Pausanias i, 27, 5.

tion of Plataea.¹ The victorious party regarded Coroneia as the battle which won the freedom of Bœotia.² The victors began to despise Athens and to look upon themselves as superior in arms.³

III. *From the restoration of the League in 447 to its dissolution after the treaty of Antalcidas, 387 B. C.*

A. THE LEAGUE

The victory of Coroneia, gained by the returning exiles and their friends from neighboring states, assured the cities autonomy under oligarchic constitutions. Those who were opposed to that form of government were banished.⁴ Though, according to the sources, Thebes could have had but a minor part in the battle, she claimed for herself the chief credit for the success⁵ and proceeded accordingly to restore the League and to knit it more firmly together under her own leadership. About this time the coinage of the other states seems to come to an abrupt end, whereas "we now have a plentiful issue of Theban staters bearing various types, mainly representations of Herakles, of great artistic merit."⁶ Though they continue to bear the shield of the League, they are all inscribed with the name of Thebes. In other words, the leading city now declared her intention to merge the League in the state of Thebes. Whether she would treat the Bœotians as *periæci* or as Thebans seems to have been left to future events to determine. Following out this plan, the federal government required the members of the League to adopt uniform constitutions—a condition which doubtless had already been partially attained by voluntary imitation. The relation of the states to the central authority was regulated, too, as we afterward find it. The acquisition of

¹ Thucydides ii, 2, 1; iii, 55, 3.

² *Ibid.* iii, 62, 5.

³ Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, iii, 5, 4; cf. Diodorus xii, 7.

⁴ Democratic exiles from Thebes and Orchomenos were coöperating most actively with Athens in 424 for the overthrow of Thebes and oligarchy; Thucydides iv, 76. Many Orchomenian exiles found a refuge in Athens; *infra*, p. 286, n. 5.

⁵ Thucydides iii, 67, 3; iv, 92, 6.

⁶ Head, *Greek Coins*, vol. viii, p. xxxix and plate xii, 1–8. There are no Bœotian coins excepting those of Thebes in the period 447–395 B. C.; *ibid.*, p. ix.

Platæa in 427 greatly strengthened the position of Thebes, which came into direct control of the annexed territory and of that part of the population which remained undisturbed by the conquest.

There were now ten members of the League. The close correspondence between the conditions of 424, as represented by Thucydides,¹ and those of 395, as described in the newly discovered Oxyrrhynchus Hellenica,² proves a general continuity of organization during the period. The relation of the states to the central government was peculiar. Eleven units of representation were distributed among these cities, according to their relative importance. Each unit was represented in the government of the union by a bœotarch. Probably at the beginning of the period there were but nine, increased to eleven by the acquisition of Platæa. For the year 424 the arrangement of forces at the battle of Delion shows the following distribution of units³:

	UNITS	CITIES
<i>Right Wing</i>	Two	for Thebes
	Two	for Platæa with her annexed communities, acquired by the League and added to Thebes in 427
<i>Center . .</i>	One	for Haliartos, Coroneia and Copæ
	One	for the rest who dwell about Lake Copais, including Acræphium
<i>Left Wing.</i>	Two	for Thespiæ with annexed communities
	One	for Tanagra
	One	for Orchomenos with Chæroneia ⁴ (and Hysiaë?)

The condition of communities described as "annexed" in the table above was somewhat like that of an Attic deme; but from their former independence they seem to have retained greater individuality. Those of the inhabitants who willingly submitted became citizens of the state to which they were joined⁵; the rest

¹ IV, 93, 4.² XI, 3.³ Thucydides iv, 93, 4.⁴ *Ibid.* iv, 76, 3.

⁵ Sufficient proof is afforded by the expression τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τῶν πρότερον μὲν ἐκείνοις (the Platæans) συμπολιτενομένων, τότε δὲ συντελούντων εἰς τὰς Θήβας (Ox. Hell. xi, 3), descriptive of the relations of certain communities to Platæa and of their transfer to Thebes.

were killed, banished, or perhaps in some cases reduced to the status of *periæci*.

In this battle the Thespians, who were on the left wing, lost a great number of their best troops. Taking advantage of their misfortune, the Thebans, who had long plotted to destroy their walls, now carried this purpose into effect (423).¹ That it was also their wish to annex this state can hardly be doubted; but for the time they contented themselves with placing philo-Thebans in office in the offending city, and at the same time they probably made the government more strictly oligarchic. In the summer of 414 the popular party at Thespiæ, feeling oppressed, attempted by force to overthrow the new régime; but the Thebans came to the rescue and put down the insurrection. Some of the rebels were taken; others escaped to Athens.² Thespiæ showed remarkable elasticity in recovering from her losses and degradation, for we find her in 395 occupying as favorable a place in the League as in 424.

A state which Thebes feared quite as much as Thespiæ was Orchomenos. Democratic exiles from this city had been most active in coöperating with the Athenians to bring about the overthrow of Thebes and of oligarchy.³ Some were ready to deliver to Athens the town of Chæroneia, which then belonged to Orchomenos. After the victory of Delion, Thebes proceeded to punish and to weaken her ancient rival. Chæroneia was taken from the latter, made an independent *polis* and associated with Acræphium. Copæ, previously associated with Haliartos, was also transferred to this group.⁴ The democrats of Orchomenos remained in exile;⁵ but the place of the city suffered no deterioration. In 419 the League acquired Heracleia, which

¹ Thucydides iv, 133.

² *Ibid.* vi, 95.

³ *Ibid.* iv, 76, 3.

⁴ These changes took place before 395; Ox. Hell. xii, 2.

⁵ An inscription containing several decrees in honor of Potamodoros, leader of emigrants from Orchomenos to Athens, is edited and commented on by U. Köhler, in *Hermes*, vol. xxxi (1896), pp. 137 *et seq.* One belongs to the spring of 423, in the archonship of Isarchos (Thucydides iv, 118). Potamodoros was granted several favors and a donation of 500 drachmas from the state. *Corpus inscriptionum Atticarum*, vol. ii, 21, proves that this family were the *πρόξενοι* of Athens for many generations. The last mentioned reference is to a decree of the year 412-411, passed in honor of Eurytion, son of Potamodoros. Eurytion was in Athens at the time.

had previously been occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison. The annexation gave offence to Sparta,¹ whose friendship for Thebes was henceforth mixed with jealousy.

In 395 B. C. the representation of the states in the federal government was as follows: Two units belonged to Thebes; two to Platæa, with Scolos, Erythræ, Scaphæ and the other towns (*χωρία*) which in earlier time had formed a part (*συμπολιτευομένων*) of the Platæan *polis*, but which now belonged (*συντελούντων*) to Thebes; two to Orchomenos with Hysiaë; two to Thespiæ with Eutresis and Thisbæ; one to Tanagra; one to Haliartos, Lebedeia and Coroneia, each furnishing one bœotarch in turn; and one to Acræphium, Copæ and Chæroneia, which in the same way were represented by one bœotarch.²

The Oxyrrhynchus Hellenica has not only made clear the principle of representation but has also settled the vexed question as to the number of the bœotarchs. A statement of Thucydides³ relative to these officials—"Whereas the rest of the bœotarchs, who are eleven in number, objected to giving battle, . . . Pagondas, . . . who together with Arianthidas . . . was bœotarch of the Thebans, . . . persuaded . . ."—has been interpreted to mean that there were eleven of these magistrates for the rest of the Bœotians in addition to those of Thebes,⁴ making thirteen in all. Poppo⁵ maintained, on the contrary, that Thucydides intended to give the total number of bœotarchs. A more serious problem concerning the number was raised by Wilamowitz-Möllendorff.⁶ Assuming that Thucydides intended to give the total number, but finding a seeming disagreement

¹ Thucydides v, 52.

² Ox. Hell. xii, 2.

³ IV, 91, 1: Τῶν ἄλλων Βουλευτῶν, οἱ εἰσιν ἑνδεκα, οὗ ξυνοπαινούντων μάχεσθαι . . . Παγώνδας ὁ Διολλάδου, Βουλευτῶν ἐκ Θηβῶν μετ' Ἀριανθίδου τοῦ Λυσιμαχίδου . . . ἔπειθε κ.τ.λ.

⁴ Two bœotarchs for Thebes are mentioned in connection with the surprise of Platæa in 431; Thucydides ii, 2, 1. Another passage (vii, 30, 3) proves merely that Thebes had more than one. After the acquisition of Platæa Thebes had the appointment of four bœotarchs, two for herself and two for the annexed communities; Ox. Hell. xii, 2.

⁵ *Ad loc. cit.* He takes as evidence the present tense of the verb εἰσί and the scholia *ad* ii, 2.

⁶ In *Hermes*, vol. viii (1874), p. 440.

between his statement and the fact that there were, as he supposed, but seven members of the union, he concluded the number eleven to be a copyist's error for seven, and his interpretation has generally been accepted.¹ The newly-discovered papyrus removes all doubt from the number eleven, and leaves the unfortunate conjecture of Wilamowitz-Möllendorff to serve as a warning against the arbitrary emendation of texts.

As the chief magistrates of the union,² the *bœotarchs* commanded the army and formed a council of war. On the eve of the battle of Delion a majority opposed a trial of arms with Athens; but Pagondas, a *bœotarch* from Thebes—the other being absent—called the soldiers before him in successive divisions and exhorted them to fight. Thucydides merely remarks that he had the chief command (*ἡγεμονίας οὐσης αὐτοῦ*), giving no hint of a rotation of the hegemony among the *bœotarchs*.³ It seems highly probable, indeed, that the leadership in war was vested permanently in Thebes, just as Sparta always exercised it in the Peloponnesian League and Athens in her confederacy and empire. The very circumstance that Pagondas overrode the decision of the council of war and appealed directly to the soldiers is evidence of an arbitrary, high-handed management of affairs on the part of Thebes which precludes the principle of rotation in command and of perfect federal equality in general.

Acting as a board, the *bœotarchs* also represented the union in foreign relations. They received envoys from other states and made provisional arrangements with them for alliances. But before definitely concluding treaties they had to submit the proposals to their respective cities, to be accepted or rejected by each, through the decision of the four councils described

¹ Cf. Lolling, in *Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Institutes in Athen*, vol. iii (1878), p. 89; Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, vol. i, p. 258, n. 1; Cauer, in *Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopädie*, vol. iii, p. 647.

² Cf. Plutarch, *Præcepta gerundae rei publicae*, 17 Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, vol. i, p. 164, is wrong in assuming the existence of an archon as the highest federal magistrate at this time. Archon and *bœotarch* are used synonymously by Ox. Hell. xi, 4.

³ Thucydides iv, 91.

below.¹ The strong centralization of power in their hands is proved by the fact that ordinarily they could count on ratification of their plans, yet in their negotiations of 421, described by Thucydides,² they were disappointed. They must have attended not only to military and diplomatic affairs but also to the general executive business of the League. Though clothed with authority which would appear to an Athenian to be excessive, they were responsible for their official conduct to their respective states; and the bœotarch who persisted in his magistracy beyond his term was liable to the death penalty.³

Each unit was represented not only in the federal executive by a bœotarch but also in the federal council (βουλή) by sixty delegates, making six hundred and sixty in all. This body, meeting on the Cadmeia,⁴ the citadel of Thebes, to deliberate on the affairs of the union, presumably at the suggestion of the bœotarchs, decided the less important questions on its own responsibility and referred the more important to the cities. It was certainly inferior in power to the collective city councils; but we know that it had a real influence from the circumstance that conflicting political parties found an advantage in gaining control of it.⁵ There was also a federal court, meeting likewise on the Cadmeia and consisting of jurors (δικασταί) who, like the federal councillors, represented in equal numbers⁶ the eleven units described above. It goes without saying that this court tried offences against the union, though we search in vain for more specific information concerning its organization and functions. It would be especially interesting to know in what relation the federal judiciary stood to the courts of component states.

The financial burden of the League was equally distributed among the units. On this principle the states paid the expenses of their own delegates to the federal council and of other representatives and made their contributions to the federal treasury.⁷ The units furnished equal military forces—a thousand heavy infantry, a hundred horsemen⁸ and probably

¹ *Infra*, p. 291.² V, 37 *et seq.*³ Pausanias ix, 14, §§ 5, 7.⁴ Ox. Hell. xi, 4.⁵ *Ibid.*, xii, 2.⁶ *Ibid.*⁷ *Ibid.* xi, 4.⁸ *Ibid.* xii, 4; *cf.* Thucydides iv, 93, 3.

about a thousand light troops.¹ These contingents were under state polemarchs, who, taking the places assigned them in the line of battle by the commander, exercised their own discretion as to the tactic formation of their several forces.² This looseness in the military system not only was a positive disadvantage in war but tended to keep the feeling of separatism alive in the individual states.

The governments of the states performed certain federal functions, and for that reason it is necessary to consider the state constitution in connection with that of the union. As the organization described by the author of the newly discovered Hellenica³ for the year 395 B. C. existed as early as 421,⁴ most probably it was either established or restored in 447. The government was timocratic; those only enjoyed public rights who possessed a certain amount of property,⁵ not specified in any known source. From the facts (1) that this form of oligarchy is described as moderate, assuring equality in the enjoyment of legal protection, in contrast with the rule of a cabal, (2) that the cities all provided a considerable number of heavy troops, (3) that the moderate oligarchs of Athens were evidently imitating the Bœotian system when they planned for a government of the five thousand who were best qualified to serve the state in person and property,⁶ we must conclude that the Bœotian franchise was broader than the knightly oligarchy and certainly not more liberal, perhaps narrower, than the hoplitic timocracy. As the population of the several cities varied greatly, there must have been correspondingly wide differences in the number of citizens *optimo iure*. Those who were thus qualified to exercise the political rights of citizens were divided

¹ The number of light troops at Delion was 10,000 in addition to 500 targeteers; Thucydides iv, 93, 3.

² *Ibid.* § 4.

³ XI, 1.

⁴ Thucydides v, 38, 2.

⁵ Ox. Hell. xi, 1: Βουλὰὶ τότε τέττα[ρες] . . . ὧν οὐ[χ ἀπασιν] τοῖς πολ[ίταις] ἐξῆ[ν] μετέχειν ἀ[λλὰ] τοῖς κεκ[τημένοις] πλῆθος τ[ι χρημ]άτων. From this passage it is clear that there were in every city two chief classes of citizens, (1) those too poor to participate in the councils, (2) those who had the property qualification for the function. What the actual rights of the lower class were may only be conjectured. Doubtless members of the higher class were eligible also to jury service in the states and in the union, and, with further restrictions, to the offices.

⁶ Thucydides viii, 65.

into four sections. These groups took turns in officiating as councils (*βουλαι*).¹ The length of the term is not stated.² To exercise a real influence it was necessary that the council should meet, not simply when summoned by the authorities, but regularly on stated days.³ Doubtless the city constitution contained a provision to that effect, though what it was we are not told.⁴ It assembled further whenever summoned by the *bœotarchs*. The council for the time being considered matters of public interest and embodied its conclusions in the form of bills. A joint session of all four councils was then held, in which these bills were further considered and accepted or rejected by vote. The councils must have supervised the entire local administration, and they stood in an important relation to the federal government. The *bœotarchs* were required to refer all weighty federal business, including declarations of war and the making of peace and alliance, to the several cities for decision.⁵ It was equally possible for the councils of a city to instruct its *bœotarchs* to bring any question affecting the welfare of the union before the proper federal authorities for deliberation and action.⁶

¹ Before the discovery of the Oxyrhynchus Hellenica these four councils were known only from Thucydides v, 38. The usual view, that they were a part of the federal government and represented four large districts into which Bœotia was assumed to have been divided, was accepted by Freeman, *Federal Government*, vol. i, pp. 163 *et seq.* The resemblance between these four councils and those provided for by the definitive oligarchic constitution drawn up for Athens in 411 (Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, 30) is easy to discover and has been mentioned by Köhler, in *Sitzungsberichte der Königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1895, pp. 455 *et seq.* The fact of imitation is so evident that we may feel justified in using the two constitutions reciprocally for illustration.

² The rendering given by the editors of the *Ox. Hell.*, p. 223—"Of these *boulai* each one in turn held a preliminary sitting and deliberation about matters of policy, and made proposals to the other three"—might lead one to suppose that each in turn held a single session. This interpretation is possible though altogether unlikely. The definitive oligarchic constitution drawn up for Athens in 411, and closely modeled after the Bœotian, specifies the length of term as one year; Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, 30, 2.

³ *Cf.* Botsford, *Roman Assemblies*, pp. 168, 173.

⁴ The Athenian council provided for by the constitution mentioned *supra*, p. 291, n. 3, was to meet every fifth day or oftener if necessary; Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, 30, 4.

⁵ Thucydides v, 38.

⁶ Freeman, *Federal Government*, vol. i, p. 164, too hastily assumes that the councils had no initiative.

In summing up the votes of the states the *bœotarchs* must have reckoned as votes for each city the number of units which she controlled—four for Thebes, two for Thespiæ *etc.* A single vote cast by a group of three states, as Haliartos, Lebedeia and Coroneia,¹ was necessarily determined by a majority of the three. This use of the referendum is a remarkable attempt to harmonize federalism with city autonomy. The degree of independence of the several cities relative to one another and to the union must have varied greatly; the Lebedeians, for instance, who had but a third of a vote, counted for little by the side of Thebes, who by securing two votes in addition to her own could decide the referendum at her pleasure.

B. POLITICS AND PARTIES; THE TREATY OF ANTALCIDAS

In considering the politics of *Bœotia* it is necessary to keep in mind the threefold conflict which was always more or less active: (1) between poor and rich, democrats and oligarchs; (2) between factions of the same party; (3) between centralization, upheld by Thebes, and separatism, represented in a varying degree by perhaps all the other states. The antagonisms here mentioned were further complicated by the relations between these conflicting forces on the one hand and outside states and parties on the other. From the restoration of the League in 447 to about the middle of the Peloponnesian war, federalists and oligarchs looked to Sparta for protection; and, as their safety depended on keeping open communications with Peloponnesus,² they cultivated friendly connections with Corinth³; whereas they hated and feared Athens as their most active and deadly enemy. A strong sympathy existed, on the other hand, between the oligarchs of Athens and those of *Bœotia*, and again between Athenian and *Bœotian* democrats, which often overrode the loyalty of the citizen to his state. In two respects the Peloponnesian war was directly advantageous to Thebes. In the first place much of the booty taken from Attica by the Peloponnesians came into their hands at a merely nominal price,⁴ and probably they themselves from the begin-

¹ *Supra*, p. 287. ² Thucydides iv, 72, 1. ³ *Ibid.* i, 27, 2. ⁴ Ox. Hell. xii, 3.

ning joined in the raids in order to carry off plunder. The author of the *Oxyrrhynchus Hellenica*¹ states that the Thebans prospered much more after they with the Lacedæmonians had fortified Deceleia against the Athenians; for they acquired at a low price the slaves and everything else taken in the war, and, as they lived along the border, they seized for themselves all the moveable property and furnishing material of Attica,² beginning with the wood and tiles of the houses. At that time the country of the Athenians was the most richly furnished in Greece; for it had suffered little loss in the former invasions of the Lacedæmonians.

This new information, while incidentally throwing a welcome light on the economic condition of Attica in the age of Pericles, helps to explain the attitude of Thebes toward the Peloponnesian war. The author probably underestimates the Athenian losses in the early part of the war and exaggerates the wealth of the country in the later period; but the result is the same: Thebes profited throughout the conflict.

Equally new is his statement as to the growth of Thebes at the expense of the other Bœotian communities:

The Thebans made great progress toward the attainment of complete prosperity from the very time when the war broke out between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians; for, when the Athenians began to threaten Bœotia, emigrants, settling in the city from Erythræ, Scaphæ, Scolos, Aulis, Schoenos, Potniæ and many other unwallèd places, doubled the population of Thebes.

Some of these small places, as Erythræ, Scolos and Scaphæ, had belonged to Plataea till the capture of that city in 427, when they were annexed to Thebes.³ This fact proves the author to be referring to the early years of the war rather than to the very beginning of it. The inhabitants of some of the other places mentioned probably migrated to Thebes shortly after the fall of Plataea, in the years 426-424, when Athens actually threatened Bœotia.⁴

¹ Ox. Hell. xii, 4.

² Τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς [ς κ] ατα[σ]κευὴν . . . ἅπασαν μετεκόμισαν ὡς αὐτοὺς.

³ *Supra*, pp. 284, 285; Ox. Hell. xii, 2.

⁴ Cf. Thucydides iii, 91. The enlargement of the walls, referred by Diodorus (*cf. supra*, p. 280, n. 1) to 457, may have taken place at this time.

Thebes profited from the war not only in these direct ways but also in gaining a stronger control over the union. After the battle of Delion, and still more after the failure of the Sicilian expedition, Bœotian democrats and separatists¹ despaired of help from Athens. In fact the Athenian oligarchs had long admired those of Bœotia; and, when after the Sicilian disaster the former came into political power, they used the Bœotian constitution as their model for the limitation of the franchise and the division of the citizens *optimo iure* into four rotating councils.² In other words, the conditions of the war not only were enabling Thebes to gain wealth and centralize Bœotia but also gave her an unexpected hope of controlling the politics of Attica. These facts amply explain her opposition to the peace of Nicias, 421 B. C. They help us to understand, too, why in the negotiations which closed the war the Thebans urged the allies to blot the conquered city out of existence.³ During the war they had developed a greed for Attic territory,⁴ which the destruction of the city would enable them to satisfy. In rejecting this proposal the Lacedæmonians may have been actuated, not only by the ideal motive ascribed to them by Xenophon,⁵ but also by the desire to maintain in central Greece a counterpoise to Thebes, whose self-aggrandizement had for some time been exciting their suspicion.

The party which dominated Thebes during the negotiations for peace, and which was responsible for the suggestion to destroy Athens, had for its leaders Leontiades, Asias and Corantadas.⁶ Soon afterward it was overthrown by a rival oligarchic faction led by Ismenias, Antitheos and Androcleidas,⁷ who opposed Sparta and hospitably received the democratic exiles from Athens during the rule of the Thirty. Their kind-

¹ That their resentment at Theban aggression was still strong in 407 is proved by Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, iii, 5, 2.

² *Supra*, p. 291, n. 1.

³ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, ii, 2, 19; Plutarch, *Lysander*, 15.

⁴ On their seizure of Panactum and their reluctance to restore it, see Thucydides v, 3, 18, 39.

⁵ *Hellenica*, ii, 2, 20.

⁶ *Ox. Hell.* xii, 2; Xenophon, *Hellenica* iii, 5, 8; Plutarch, *Lysander*, 15.

⁷ *Ox. Hell.* xii, 1. For Antitheos, Xenophon, *Hellenica*, iii, 5, 1, has substituted Galaxidoros. Such discrepancies are not to be set down as contradictions.

ness to these refugees sprang from no friendship for Athens or democracy, but from the hope of being able to turn the occasion to the disadvantage of Sparta.¹

On receiving an invitation from Lacedæmon to join in putting down the democratic force at Peiræus, 403 B. C., Thebes refused, ostensibly because Athens had done nothing contrary to the treaty but in reality because she suspected the Lacedæmonians of a desire to annex Attica to their own territory.² Sparta did not forget this neglect of allegiance.³ But the governing faction at Thebes was soon to be irreconcilably embittered by the discovery that the Lacedæmonians were secretly interfering in their affairs for the purpose of restoring to power the recently overthrown party of philo-Laonians.⁴ When therefore Agesilaus, in the role of Agamemnon, overlord of all Greece, attempted to set sail from Aulis, the Bœotians sent cavalry to forbid his sacrifice. These troops performed their duty well; seizing the pieces of victims, they scattered them about the altars. Agesilaus embarked in extreme indignation, calling the gods to witness this insulting sacrilege.⁵

Meanwhile the Bœotian separatists continued to cherish their dislike for Thebes;⁶ and early in the Corinthian war it proved an easy task for Lysander, at the head of an invading force from Peloponnesus, to detach Orchomenos from the union, 394 B. C.⁷ In spite of heavy losses the federal government, with little wavering,⁸ persisted in the war till Persia, transferring her support from central Greece to Peloponnesus, forced upon Hellas the treaty of Antalcidas, 387 B. C. From the beginning of the negotiations the Thebans were apprehensive for the integrity of the union.⁹ The terms, which seem to have been

¹ Ox. Hell. xii, i.

² Xenophon, Hellenica ii, 4, 30.

³ *Ibid.* iii, 5, 5.

⁴ This is new information from Ox. Hell. ii, 2. The author, speaking of the year 395, states that the Thebans had long been hostile to Lacedæmon, *ὅτι τοῖς ἐναν[τίαι]ς τῶν πολιτῶν αὐτοῖς ἐχρῶντο φίλοις*, which must refer to the time earlier than the embarkation of Agesilaus from Aulis. The opponents of the men in power were certainly not democrats but another oligarchic faction.

⁵ Xenophon, Hellenica iii, 4, 3 *et seq.*; Plutarch, Agesilaus, 6.

⁶ Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia iii, 5, 2.

⁷ Xenophon, Hellenica iii, 5, 6; Plutarch, Lysander, 18.

⁸ Xenophon, Hellenica iv, 5, 6.

⁹ *Ibid.* iv, 8, 15.

composed with especial reference to their League, declared all Greek cities autonomous excepting certain island possessions of Athens.¹ All the states of Greece unreservedly swore to the treaty with the exception of the Thebans. They were as willing indeed as any, but claimed the right to take the oath in behalf of all the Bœotians.² Though we now hear the enunciation of this doctrine for the first time, Thebes had long been tending toward it; in fact it had been foreshadowed by her coinage since 447. The treaty of Antalcidas forced her to take the decisive step. The recent desertion of Orchomenos and the growth of separatist feeling in the other states were making federation difficult; Bœotians, Greeks and Persians were sure to interpret autonomy as the unconditioned independence of the states and the complete dissolution of the League. Thebes would win a great success, on the other hand, if she could induce Persia and the states of Greece to consider all the Bœotians Thebans. In this way she hoped to preserve the unity of Bœotia and even to make a notable advance in centralization. Whether in the event of success she would really have absorbed the states or reduced them to subjection remains unknown. It is true that her enemies looked upon her allies as *periæci*³; but her earlier policy in the matter seems to indicate her intention to treat as Thebans the Bœotians who would accept this status and to banish recalcitrants or reduce them to submission. The present study tends to prove that the Thebans were not so tyrannical nor the Bœotians so enslaved as Freeman and others have tried to make out. The solution of the Bœotian problem along one or the other of the two lines above indicated was prevented by a threat of war from Sparta in case the states should not be permitted to sign for themselves. Thebes yielded. Her promise to leave the cities autonomous was fulfilled,⁴ and again the League was temporarily dissolved.

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¹ Xenophon, *Hellenica* v, 1, 31.

² *Ibid.* v, 1, 32.

³ *Ibid.* vi, 4, 6: *Αἱ περιουκίδες ἀντῶν πόλεις*. Epaminondas seems to speak of the Bœotian cities as having the same status as the Laconian *periæci*; Pausanias ix, 13, 2. He may be thinking here, however, not of their subjection to the leading state but simply of their lack of autonomy.

⁴ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, vi, 1, 33, 36; Plutarch, *Agessilaus*, 23; Diodorus xiv, 110.